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The international banking crisis and domestic 
financial intermediation in emerging market 
economies: issues for South Africa 
South African Reserve Bank 
Differences between South Africa and other emerging market economies 
(EMEs) during the crisis 
South Africa has not been directly affected by the financial crisis due to a mixture of 
historical, fundamental and circumstantial factors. In general, South African financial 
institutions have had fairly limited exposure to foreign structured finance products, and have 
been subjected to fairly conservative financial regulation and risk management practices, 
within the context of sound macroeconomic policies.  
As a result, in contrast to central banks in the industrialised world, the South African Reserve 
Bank (SARB) has not experienced any pressure to alter its monetary operations since the 
onset of the financial crisis. The fluctuations in the amounts of liquidity provided in its 
refinancing auctions, even though subdued, were exaggerated by the relatively small money 
market shortage, which fluctuated between South African rand (ZAR) 9 billion and 
ZAR 14 billion. The SARB did not have to respond to any shortage of liquidity by increasing 
the amounts offered in its monetary operations. 
The SARB, in accordance with its inflation targeting framework, implemented a tightening 
monetary policy stance from June 2006, in reaction to a deteriorating inflation outlook at the 
time. The repurchase rate was increased from 7.0% to a peak of 12.0%. In December 2008, 
the Monetary Policy Committee of the SARB reduced its policy rate by 50 basis points (bp), 
followed by further cuts to the current all-time low level of 6.5%. However, as explained in the 
monetary policy statements, these reductions were facilitated by an improved inflation 
outlook against a backdrop of slowing economic growth and declining commodity prices. 
Consistent with the SARB’s exchange rate policy of non-intervention, the rate changes were 
not intended to influence the level of the exchange rate, which is left to be determined by 
market forces, nor were they changed to assist the banking sector or to react to the global 
financial crisis. South Africa’s banking sector and financial markets continued to operate 
effectively during the crisis. 
In South Africa, the spread between the market rate (as measured by the South African 
Benchmark Overnight Rate (Sabor) on deposits) and the SARB’s repurchase rate continued 
to fluctuate within its usual range. The spread also remained negative, that is, market rates 
remained below the policy rate, indicating an absence of extraordinary upward pressure on 
overnight rates. Volumes of overnight interbank lending activity in South Africa also 
continued as usual. If anything, volumes increased somewhat towards the end of 2008, but 
not to the extent that the volumes indicated any underlying trend or problem in the interbank 
market. 
The level of the SARB’s gross reserves declined by around USD 500 million to 
USD 33.8 billion as at the end of February 2009. However, this decline can essentially be 
attributed to valuation changes, as the price of gold declined and the US dollar appreciated. 
The SARB reduced its borrowed reserves from USD 3.5 billion in 2006 to around 
USD 640 million as at the end of February 2009. This reduction in borrowed reserves was a 
strategic decision taken due to the fact that South Africa’s foreign reserves position had 
become healthier, and was not due to the financial crisis. In line with its exchange rate policy 
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and has not been required in any way to use its reserves to support the stability of the 
financial system.  
This is not to say that the South African financial system is not at risk of the second-round 
effects of a dwindling global economy, or that the crisis will not highlight some financial 
sector weaknesses that have to be resolved. South Africa is therefore very much part of the 
global reform agenda and is totally committed to finding ways to strengthen the global 
financial system without placing unnecessary burdens on countries that have no need for the 
measures needed in others. 
Stylised facts 
1.   Cross-border bank lending to EMEs 
(a)  Supply versus demand factors 
In our view, most of the decline (both in value and in number of transactions) relates to 
demand factors (primarily the severe contraction in international trade). In our chosen EMEs, 
the competitive banking landscape remains strong and certain institutions have taken the 
opportunity, given the strains on certain global banking institutions, to increase their market 
share.  
Banking institutions globally have, since mid-2008, repriced risk more appropriately, which 
has contributed to the decline of cross-border EME lending. There is adequate supply from 
banks, however, at a significantly increased cost.  Banks made strategic decisions to 
withdraw from specific markets and products, which also affected the supply/demand 
balance.  
As a result of the crisis, international banks’ available capital was eroded and capital 
requirements increased, as did the cost of funding. With the expected stepping up of financial 
regulations globally, where banks will be required to hold more capital against their risk-
weighted assets, there will be further constraints on the amount of lending globally and the 
terms of lending that banks will be prepared to undertake.  
The hypothesis that there has been a decline in cross-border bank lending to EMEs is not 
necessarily true for sub-Saharan Africa, as the region has seen an increase in bank lending. 
Figure 1 below shows that there was a decline in 2008 in line with the global markets but an 
increase in 2009.  
South African financial institutions are forming funds to enable them to lend to finance sub-
Saharan African transactions. There has also been an increase in loans from development 
finance institutions (DFIs) such as the International Finance Corporation (IFC), Deutsche 
Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft (DEG)/Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (Kfw) to 
South African institutions for projects on the continent.  
Some possible reasons for the decline in cross-border funding levels in 2008 could be 
attributed to:  
  Reduced appetite for riskier sectors overall (see section (b) below). 
  Increased oversight by parent banks of subsidiary lending, resulting in a reduction of 
overall lending exposure. 
  Expensive pricing levels have deterred companies from coming to market; those 
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  Increased focus on maximising total return on equity (ROE), resulting in a 
rationalisation of absolute numbers of clients banked. 
  The decline in volume was also partly due to the long execution timeline of 
transactions in sub-Saharan Africa. In project finance specifically, projects require 
government or parliamentary sign off. Projects for parastatals take longer to finalise 
in terms of structuring, approvals and development to bankable stage, contributing 
to a perceived decline in the number of deals executed. 
Figure 1 
Movements in bank loan volumes in sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Source: Dealogic, SSA bank loan movements, 11 January 2010 
Figure 2 illustrates the decline in cross-border lending in Europe, the Middle East and Africa 
(EMEA) global syndicated lending activity. The decline was most likely due to the financial 
conditions prevailing at international banks and the subsequent policies imposed or adopted 
after the onset of the crisis. Banks have continued to prioritise limited available capital for 
existing clients offering specific ancillary business opportunities. In addition, banks have 
limited their exposure to northern/eastern European names in general, and have broadly 
stuck to their areas of expertise. There has been a reduction in the number of European 
institutions due to European government restrictions or the conditions pertaining to the 
bailout funds received during the crisis. Some representative offices and branches have 
been closed down due to EU Commission discussions and guidance. The contraction in the 
number of European institutions on the African continent has presented an opportunity for 






























































Source: Dealogic, EMEA bank loan movements, 11 January 2010 
In summary, it can be said that South African banks are not heavily dependent on foreign 
funding, and cross-border bank lending is generally low. During the crisis, South African 
banks’ general experience was that, although the price and maturity of cross-border bank 
lending was affected, it was still possible for the large South African banks to obtain the 
lending they required. Any decline in cross-border lending was therefore caused by a mixture 
of supply and demand factors, ie the foreign lending banks increased the price, whether for 
risk management reasons or because of their own balance sheet weakness, and the South 
African domestic banks also took on less funding due to the decline in their own lending as a 
result of the economic contraction.  
(b)  Types of lending that have been hardest hit 
There has been a general “flight to safety” both in terms of credit quality and collateral. This 
has benefited the sovereign issuers and highly rated corporate issuers. Longer-dated 
financing and hard currency financing have been constrained due to the availability of term 
funding and the related (higher) cost of borrowing in hard currencies. 
Tier 2, unsecured and mezzanine lending has all but evaporated, while investor appetite for 
securitised assets has declined significantly. Furthermore, certain project financings, 
particularly in the resources sector, have been delayed given the uncertainty in the global 
economy. Trade finance continues to be available, although the decline in international trade 
has impacted this market. The majority of export letters of credit (L/Cs) volumes are received 
from EMEs, mostly from the Far East. 
The top five hardest hit industries in sub-Saharan Africa were the insurance, food and 
beverage, mining, property, and textile industries, each lending significantly less in 2009 than 
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Sub-Saharan Africa credit extension 
Source: Dealogic, sub-Saharan Africa credit extension, 11 January 2010.  
In South Africa, the financial services sector has been significantly affected by the financial 
crisis, as well as property finance – specifically hotels and the leisure sector due to their 
dependency on consumer demand. Banks have not ventured into significant sub-Saharan 
property lending and do not have comparable history.  
Microfinance institutions’ funding sources dried up because international DFIs significantly 
reduced their funding to domestic DFIs in order to shore up their own balance sheets. Small- 
and medium-sized enterprises and borrowers seeking new money have suffered, as existing 
credit relationships have been given priority. 
(c)  Evidence of changes in cross-border lending terms 
There has been a general tightening of lending criteria in all respects for cross-border 
lending, largely driven by the higher liquidity cost of hard currency funding plus the perceived 
deterioration of counterparty risk. Banks have also sought to reduce their exposure to various 
types of other risks.  
Generally, maturities have shortened, spreads have widened significantly and there has 
been a shift towards better-rated counterparties and collateral. The upward shift in credit 
margins reflects both the pricing of risk and the liquidity premium now demanded. This is a 
material shift in practice where liquidity was previously taken for granted and excluded from 
pricing considerations. 
(d)  Changes in the terms of derivatives contracts offered by international banks 
There have been no significant changes in the product offerings or terms relating to 
derivatives contracts. There has, however, been a trend towards improved contract 
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against formal International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) agreements and 
require settlement to be through continuous linked settlement (CLS). Most banks have also 
reviewed and changed the collateral threshold requirements under the related credit support 
annex (CSA) agreements (ie exposure limits have been reduced). 
There is, however, a general move towards lower thresholds in margining agreements. 
Thresholds are negotiated in line with the bank’s external credit rating. In most instances, the 
threshold would reduce to zero should the counterparty be rated sub-investment grade. The 
margining agreements only provide for the posting of cash in EUR, USD and GBP as 
collateral. 
There have been no significant changes in the approach of international banks to the four 
largest South African banks, although, generally, all parties have been pushing for tighter 
CSA requirements with financial institution (FI) counterparties in line with international trends. 
(e)   Parent financing to affiliates versus financing to unrelated parties 
“Home bias” appears to be a strong theme at the moment and banks have been more 
inclined to direct capital towards business areas in markets where they have a very strong 
presence and well-established franchise. In this regard, affiliates that are not contributing 
materially to the group income statement or long-term group strategy have seen capital 
withdrawn by parent banks only to be reallocated to areas where client business is 
substantial and strategic.  
This changing trend is a consequence of the changing risk appetite, “back to basics” banking 
and a smaller pool of available bank capital following significant balance sheet impairments. 
2.   Domestic bank intermediation: domestically owned versus 
foreign-owned banks 
Changes in bank business models in the domestic market 
(a)  Changes in bank funding  
Domestic banks’ response to the crisis was less drastic than that of foreign-owned banks, but 
there is evidence of a contraction in lending and a shortening of maturities. Domestic banks 
voluntarily increased their holdings in statutory liquid assets noticeably over a sustained 
period. 
The interbank market was not severely affected by the crisis and continued to function 
normally, but with slightly increased caution and an increased preference for shorter-term 
funding. Sources of funding remained unchanged, and wholesale funding from Asian 
countries became more accessible. 
It should be noted that the maturity of South African domestic bank funding is generally short, 
with up to 50% of funding being short-term. It may have shortened further as a result of the 
crisis. Nevertheless, the interbank market never ceased to function, and there were no 
instances of banks being unable to fund themselves due to hoarding in the market. The retail 
component of South African bank funding is also generally quite small, with up to 50% of 
funding being wholesale, ie interbank and other FIs’ deposits with the banks. This may also 
have worsened as a result of the crisis, as the savings of individuals dwindled due to layoffs. 
Nevertheless, it is a fairly “closed” system as a result of the long period of exchange control 
and, therefore, excess funds always tend to end up with the banks. While contractually short-
term and wholesale, much of the bank funding is in practice constantly rolled over, so the de 
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(b)  Changes in bank lending 
Domestic banks’ lending contracted over the crisis period. Banks became much more risk-
averse and tightened their credit criteria. Demand from the household sector declined over 
the period owing to the high levels of indebtedness and the aftermath of the high interest 
rates. 
Corporate bond origination ceased almost entirely over the period while loans experienced 
subdued demand.  
Generally, the most significant change in bank lending was a rapid decline in the rate of 
growth in almost all types of lending. South African banks experienced a long period of high 
lending growth despite the fact that lending standards were never lowered to the same extent 
as in the United States, for instance. When the financial crisis occurred, the South African 
financial system was not directly affected, but when the world economy started to slow and 
exports began to decline, bank lending growth all but disappeared. This was due both to the 
procyclical behaviour of banks and the shrinking demand from retail borrowers in particular, 
who had “learnt their lesson”. The loan to value ratio for mortgage lending was lowered, 
resulting in more secured lending. Corporate lending decreased in proportion to household 
lending due to the economic contraction. South African banks’ exposure to debt securities 
did not change significantly during the crisis, and is generally low.  
(c)   Liquidity of banks’ balance sheets 
There is evidence of a build-up in liquid assets as banks have placed money in short-term 
instruments that qualify as liquid assets. Figure 4 below shows how the liquid assets held by 
the banking sector have increased. 
Figure 4 
Banks' holding of statutory liquid assets 
 
Regarding the shortening of lending maturities, banks generally contracted their lending 
activities. Lending commitments were generally either formally withdrawn or not honoured. In 
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Changes to South African banks’ balance sheets were not as dramatic and rapid as in other 
countries. Banks deleveraged under the pressure of international expectation by shrinking 
lending books, holding back on dividends, and general cost cutting. South African banks’ 
leverage was rather low in comparison to other jurisdictions, around 17 times, and has 
improved even further following the crisis. Liquid assets as a percentage of total assets 
remained conservative and well within the regulatory requirements throughout the crisis 
period. It is likely, however, that banks shortened the maturity of their loan books as a result 
of the crisis.  
(d)   Responses of foreign-owned versus domestically owned local banks  
Foreign-owned banks include Absa Bank Limited (Absa), which is the second largest bank in 
South Africa and specialises primarily in domestic retail and wholesale operations. However, 
Absa responded to the crisis in a similar manner to domestic banks and, therefore, the 
analysis of the response of foreign-owned banks does not include Absa.  
As a result of the crisis, foreign-owned banks contracted their lending activities in an effort to 
maintain short, matched positions. Simultaneously, funding from their head offices dried up 
and local long-term funding became scarce, while spreads on shorter-term funding were 
increased. Foreign banks’ exposures were concentrated mainly in the corporate sector. A 
number of locally originated derivatives transactions were booked or transferred abroad to 
regional head offices.  
The main difference in the two responses was that foreign-owned banks with head offices in 
the worst-affected countries experienced greater funding difficulties following their head 
offices’ withdrawal of excess funding and their decision to stop the provision of new funding.  
Ever since their return to South Africa following the divestments of the 1980s, foreign-owned 
banks have not really re-entered the retail lending market and, therefore, any differences in 
their response did not affect the household market. Local banks continued to express 
confidence in the South African economy and seemed both confident and cautiously 
optimistic about their ability to weather the storm. Foreign-owned banks operating locally 
were impacted by the news about their principals and/or owners abroad, which, if bad, 
emphasised their de-linkage and independence, and which, if good, stressed the willingness 
of their parents to stand by them. Generally, mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activity and 
initial public offerings (IPOs) dwindled to almost nothing and, combined with the fact that 
trade-related financing activity all but disappeared, foreign-owned banks were generally 
either closing down or merely riding out the storm as best they could. 
3.   Impact on local money and debt markets 
(a)   Effects of the crisis on liquidity in various segments of EME foreign exchange 
markets and the implications for domestic money markets 
Although several countries reported severe foreign exchange (FX) shortages, this was not 
the case in South Africa. Movements in the spot exchange rate of the South African rand 
were related to movements in the currencies of developed economies and were not due to 
any direct impact of the global crisis on South African markets. This was also the case in the 
FX forward market. Temporary month-end liquidity shortages resulted in movements in 
forward rates at month-end, but these rates generally stabilised after month-end. 
There were, however, changes in the turnover in the various components of the FX market. 
The rate of growth in total FX turnover declined significantly in 2008 in light of the credit 
crisis. In the South African context, total turnover in the FX market increased by 62% 
between 2003 and 2007, and grew by 1.8% in 2008. FX swap and forward turnover declined 
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22%, that of swaps declined to 68% from 70% and the share of forward exchange turnover 
remained unchanged at 7.0%.  
The turnover figures referred to in the previous paragraph include the SARB’s participation in 
these markets. However, the SARB’s share is relatively small, and the impact on the 
domestic money markets was therefore also relatively small. 
The events surrounding the collapse of Lehman Brothers had an impact on sentiment in the 
domestic markets, but movements in these markets were mainly due to domestic factors 
rather than the consequences of direct exposures by local institutions to events occurring as 
a result of the global financial crisis. 
International financial integration and financial market liberalisation sharply increased the 
supply of FX to South African markets in the pre-crisis period. In addition, South Africa 
experienced strong capital inflows  linked to both foreign direct investment and portfolio 
investment over the same period. This increasing inflow of foreign capital increased the 
volume of transactions in the spot, forward and swap markets and positively affected the 
ZAR exchange rate. There were no severe liquidity problems arising from the crisis in any of 
these markets. The domestic money market also continued to operate normally, with only 
normal fluctuations in rates and spreads. 
However, there is no denying that the crisis increased the risk of a sudden slowdown or 
reversal of capital inflows driven by global deleveraging and flight to safety, in addition to the 
collapse in export demand associated with the global recession.  
(b)   Effects of the crisis on local money markets 
The impact of the global credit crisis on the domestic money markets was not as pronounced 
as in developed countries. South Africa experienced only negligible increases in domestic 
money market rates at the time when Libor rates increased significantly. The marginal 
increases happened only occasionally when local institutions that would otherwise have 
obtained funding from international markets resorted to domestic markets. In general, the 
local interbank market functioned effectively.  
Generally, the increased supply of capital flows fed into and added to the liquidity supply in 
the domestic money markets. It contributed to the challenge facing financial authorities to 
drain the inflow of foreign capital from the domestic markets, and added to the cost of such 
sterilisation. Nevertheless, broadly speaking, the local money market operated normally 
throughout the crisis period. 
(c)  Effects of the crisis on secured and unsecured lending (local currency) 
between banks  
The local interbank market experienced no disruptions as a result of the global crisis. South 
African banks were largely shielded against the direct effects of the crisis due to a sound 
regulatory framework and the fact that domestic banks had not invested heavily in high-risk 
securities and had very little exposure to foreign markets in their loan books. Furthermore, 
there were no indications that the interbank market in repurchase transactions had been 
adversely impacted. 
In South Africa, interbank lending continued to function more or less normally, and there 
were no reported incidents where ostensibly sound banks were refused loans by other 
banks. There was no reason for the authorities to provide additional liquidity to the market or 
emergency liquidity assistance to any bank. In addition, the SARB did not have to guarantee 
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(d)   Difficulties in the domestic government debt market 
Causes of significant difficulties in the domestic government debt market during the crisis 
were: 
  Large-volume selling of local shares and bonds by non-resident investors due to 
increased risk aversion. 
  Increased budget deficit which necessitated increased government debt issuances. 
The South African Government had to issue a further ZAR 70 billion in domestic 
debt to finance the borrowing requirement (the budget deficit was revised upwards 
to 7.6% of GDP in 2009/10 from 1.0% in 2008/09, due to growth in government 
expenditure and lower projected revenue.) 
  The SARB did not increase its holdings of government bonds to inject liquidity into 
the interbank market. 
The broader economic context for the government debt market was a general rise in risk 
aversion, increasing concerns about the economic prospects and vulnerabilities of emerging 
markets, the negative impact of rising fiscal deficits linked to fiscal stimulus packages and the 
lack of appetite for government debt (sovereign risk).  
The reality in international financial markets is that emerging market debt is significantly 
affected during a crisis. Thus, bond spreads and premia generally soar for EME government 
debt, especially for local currency government debt and where there is significant exchange 
rate volatility, which increases exchange rate risk. 
South Africa did not experience the same level of difficulties as other EMEs, and even 
succeeded in the midst of the aftermath of the crisis to issue further debt that was 
oversubscribed and at favourable rates to South Africa. This is attributable to good investor 
confidence in the government’s macroeconomic policies.  
4.   Central bank instruments to deal with the crisis 
(a)   Instruments at the disposal of central banks to deal with the domestic 
repercussions of an international financial crisis 
The SARB did not have to implement unconventional monetary policy measures to dampen 
the impact of the global financial and economic crisis on the South African banking system. It 
did, however, introduce some flexibility in the execution of its inflation targeting mandate. 
Without sound banking and other financial regulations, the domestic financial markets would 
have been more severely and directly impacted by the global financial market turmoil. Capital 
controls pertaining to residents also contributed to the insulation of the domestic financial 
system from the global financial markets. 
The SARB nevertheless has sufficient instruments at its disposal to deal with the impact of 
an international crisis, but each comes with a cost. The view of the SARB is that it is 
sometimes more difficult, but better in the long term, to do nothing rather than to react in a 
knee-jerk way. So, as the international financial crisis erupted, the SARB focused on 
pragmatic contingency arrangements such as consideration of the broadening of the 
definition of securities qualifying as liquid assets and eligible as collateral for emergency 
liquidity assistance. Other steps taken were the intensification of supervisory contact with the 
large financial institutions and keeping up to date with their conditions, risks and challenges. 
In addition, the SARB intensified its monitoring of international developments and became 
active in the various forums to evaluate the impact of the crisis and discuss measures to 
strengthen the financial system. This was considered important due to the different 
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debate was balanced and that inappropriate reform measures were not imposed on countries 
where they had no relevance.  
(b)   Monetary policy responses 
The SARB has adopted inflation targeting as a framework for monetary policy. This is very 
much a forward-looking approach and has informed monetary policy decisions since its 
inception in 2000.The South African economy is an open, commodity-based economy and, 
as such, is dependent on developments in the international economy. Although the well-
regulated domestic banking system was relatively well-insulated from the fallout of the global 
financial crisis, the domestic economy was affected by the international economic downturn, 
and the resulting domestic recession required appropriate fiscal and monetary policy 
responses.  
Apart from these concerns, the SARB has also focused on maintaining and improving its 
domestic market operations. Liquidity in the domestic and international interbank markets is 
carefully monitored. Although contingency plans were put in place and communicated to the 
banking counterparties, it was not necessary to provide any additional or special liquidity to 
domestic banks beyond the normal daily operations. 
In general, the response of monetary policy to an international crisis should be determined by 
the long-term macroeconomic cost of the potential impact on the economy. If there is a 
possibility that disruption in the domestic financial system could have social costs of a 
magnitude greater than the private costs, then the monetary authority would be justified in 
using all means at its disposal to prevent the disruption or restore stability. This is because 
sustained price stability, which is without question the primary aim of the monetary authority, 
is either unattainable or of no value if there is chaos in the financial system. It is unattainable 
because an efficient financial system is the conduit for executing monetary policy, and it is of 
no value because price stability is of no consequence if intermediation failure damages the 
real economy beyond repair.  
The SARB regularly considers possible currency depreciation as a factor in determining 
policy rates, whether before, during or after a crisis. However, it believes that only supply and 
demand in the international currency market can determine the value of the South African 
rand. The most it can do is to try and smooth out excessive technical volatility in the short 
term through open market operations within the current inflation targeting framework.  
Consequently, although inflation was outside the target range of 3 to 6%, the monetary policy 
stance was loosened significantly in the face of an expected moderation in inflation and a 
weakening economy. Nevertheless, some upside risks to the inflation outlook are still 
prevalent and have constrained the monetary policy response somewhat. 
(c)   Measures taken to support (or replace) interbank lending in local currency 
The interbank market in local currency continued to function effectively. It was not necessary 
at any stage during the crisis to introduce any additional or unconventional measures to 
maintain market functionality. 
(d)   Measures taken to support foreign currency refinancing of banks/corporations 
The SARB’s prevailing policy on intervention in the FX market consists of purchasing FX to 
fund foreign payments on behalf of clients and, depending on market conditions, to 
accumulate foreign reserves. However, the SARB did not intervene in the FX market to 
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In conclusion, the SARB believes that the value of the currency should be determined by the 
demand and supply of FX in the market and that it should not endeavour to change these 
conditions. 
(e)   Other available instruments  
While no unconventional measures were contemplated by the SARB during the crisis period, 
should the need arise, South African regulatory authorities have established an approach to 
deal with liquidity management, both in normal times and in times of distress. At the financial 
market level, the liquidity-related interventions of the SARB are primarily in the form of 
providing liquidity through repurchase agreements, which can be collateralised by eligible 
liquid assets as prescribed by the SARB. In addition to providing market liquidity, temporary 
liquidity problems in solvent banks during crisis times can be addressed by the SARB 
through the provision of liquidity assistance against the pledge of suitable assets under 
certain conditions. 
An insolvent bank will not usually be assisted in this way and an orderly exit plan will be 
followed, unless it is systemically significant. If an insolvent bank is regarded as systemically 
significant, the potential knock-on effects of settlement defaults on the financial system could 
have consequences far beyond the costs to the stakeholders of the ailing bank. In those 
cases, the government may decide to assist such a bank in the interest of protecting the 
financial system. 
(f)   Lessons learned from the crisis regarding the role of FX reserves and 
interventions 
Over the past few years, the SARB has managed to substantially increase the level of official 
gross gold and FX reserves. Although the level is still below that of some peer economies, it 
is perceived to have contributed substantially to reducing the country’s external vulnerability. 
Lessons learned from South Africa’s previous experiences and from various other countries 
are that it remains a severe risk for central banks in EMEs to intervene in the FX markets to 
influence the level of the exchange rate. 
The crisis has not, therefore, changed the view of the SARB – for a small but open economy 
such as South Africa’s, the level of FX reserves needed to guarantee that interventions will 
succeed in every case would be too onerous and costly for its economy to maintain. 